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Introduction by Matthew Jones, London School of Economics and Political Science 
n his post-war recollections of the January 1943 Casablanca Conference, General Albert C. Wedemeyer, 
who had attended as a senior member of the U.S. Army’s Operations Division, wrote that the Anglo-
American strategic decisions taken there to concentrate on Mediterranean operations for the coming year, 
with the immediate target an invasion of Sicily, represented a victory of British guile over American 
innocence: “…we lost our shirts and are now committed to a subterranean umbilicus operation in mid-
summer.  One could say we came, we listened and we were conquered.”1  Later in that same year, Harold 
Macmillan, having arrived in Algiers as British Resident Minister at General Dwight Eisenhower’s Allied 
Force Headquarters, explained to a young Richard Crossman (who was later to become a minister in the 
Labour Governments of the 1960s) the importance of allowing his American colleague on the integrated 
Anglo-American staff to “have the feeling that he is running the show.  This will enable you to run it yourself.  
We, my dear Crossman, are Greeks in this American empire … We must run AFHQ as the Greek slaves ran 
the operations of the Emperor Claudius.”2  These two famous quotations capture the abiding impression, 
derived from a whole generation of military historians and memorialists, of the nature of Anglo-American 
relations, and the disinterested and almost aimless nature of much U.S strategy and policy when it came to 
the Mediterranean theatre of operations during the Second World War.  In this reading, U.S. resources and 
attentions were diverted by British pressure (much of it originating from considerations of post-war British 
power and influence) and strategic circumstances into a series of peripheral operations which led into a 
grinding battle of attrition on the Italian peninsula.  Only with the Tehran Conference of November 1943 
was some resemblance of strategic sense restored, when British Prime Minister Winston Churchill was pushed 
by the combined weight of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin into full-fledged 
commitment to a cross-Channel invasion of France in the summer of 1944, to be complemented by an attack 
on southern France using forces otherwise employed in Italy.  Moreover, when it came to the affairs of the 
liberated territories of the Mediterranean, the Americans, it was believed, had no ostensible political aims, in 
contrast to a British approach that favoured the restoration of pre-war monarchical regimes.  As in the 
military sphere, the Americans tended to play a secondary role throughout. 
Andrew Buchanan’s refreshing and significant new take on wartime U.S. involvement in the Mediterranean, 
as all the reviews below affirm, successfully challenges many of these entrenched images.  By meshing military, 
diplomatic, and economic factors into his analysis, and through extensive mining of the archival record, 
Buchanan presents American policy as activist and opportunistic, in a part of the world perceived as vital for 
both victory over the Axis powers and the post-war projection of U.S. values and interests.  Central in 
Buchanan’s account is the strategic vision of Roosevelt.  While for some historians Roosevelt’s wartime 
policies are regarded as opaque or slippery, for Buchanan Roosevelt had a ‘grand strategy’ which he executed 
in a consistent and effective way.  Far from being drawn reluctantly into the Mediterranean, it was Roosevelt 
who sensed the strategic opportunities that would open up if the U.S. military presence were exploited.  As 
Mary K. Barbier puts it, the Mediterranean would become a ‘springboard’ toward the U.S. post-war role of 
‘superpower’, and certainly a state with a dominant influence over the post-war settlement in Western and 
                                                        
1 Albert C. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports! (New York, 1958), 192. 
2 Quoted in Anthony Sampson, Macmillan: A Study in Ambiguity (London, 1967), 61. 
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Southern Europe.  Barbier sees Buchanan as presenting a Roosevelt where “every strategic position he took” 
had the post-war position in mind where the U.S. could assert global leadership. 
Similarly, Douglas Porch notes how Buchanan has Roosevelt pursuing both military victory and preparations 
for post-war hegemony simultaneously.  But Porch also wonders about the coherence of Roosevelt’s plans, 
when flexibility was often necessary and policy sometimes inconsistent, making the notion of a grand strategy 
arguably ‘meaningless’ and dominance coming more by ‘default’ than design.  Finding Buchanan’s book both 
“fascinating and informative”, Dan Plesch wanted to see more stress on the UN aspect to Roosevelt’s 
thinking, and to hear more about the play of domestic politics, particularly as they related to the key decision 
to commit the United States to an invasion of French North Africa in the autumn of 1942.  Nevertheless, for 
David B. Woolner, Buchanan’s study fundamentally changes our ideas of Roosevelt’s policies in the region, 
and, by tying together all aspects of U.S. involvement, not just the military dimension favoured by more 
orthodox histories, opens up new dimensions, such as American hostility, despite the high phrases of the 
Atlantic Charter, to signs of anti-colonial restiveness in Morocco and Algeria. Avshalom Rubin writes that 
Buchanan “will inspire his readers to think harder about Roosevelt’s geopolitical legacy” and the essential 
alignment of the United States behind the forces of reaction in France, Spain, Italy and the Balkans that he 
recounts.  For Buchanan it was the “industrial workers, communist activists, and leftist partisans” who were 
marginalised by the post-war political settlement that U.S. policy did so much to bring about.  According to 
Rubin this “essentially Marxist” argument is reminiscent of the Wisconsin school of revisionism, and he 
mildly chides Buchanan for presenting no credible alternative to the forms of regime which emerged in post-
war Italy and France in particular. 
Alongside all the plaudits, Porch offers the most sustained and detailed critique of Buchanan’s work.  He 
raises concerns over the presumption that U.S. post-war hegemony in the Mediterranean must have been 
achieved through a series of pre-meditated steps, and argues that at times there is too much conjecture mixed 
in with the careful sifting of evidence (especially over the decision by General Mark Clark to drive directly for 
Rome in May 1944, which Buchanan sees as likely to have resulted from Roosevelt’s political intervention 
rather than Clark’s notorious quest for favourable publicity).  Lacking as well, Porch suggests, is the sense of 
the ongoing war itself – where military operations were unrelenting and could carry their own momentum.  
That said, Porch still finds Buchanan’s book “thoroughly researched and compelling,” helping to reinvigorate 
the field. 
Overall, the reviewers agree that Buchanan has written an ambitious, provocative and wide-ranging book that 
challenges prevailing narratives of U.S. policy, and of the Anglo-American relationship.  By 1945 there was a 
quite remarkable range of American interests in evidence across the region, with an entire network of new 
bases along the North African littoral, a firm hand being played in the politics of both Italy and Spain, 
political involvement in Balkan affairs, and the extension of influence into Turkey and the Middle East from 
the eastern end of the Mediterranean.  “The result of Washington’s wartime engagement with the 
Mediterranean,” Buchanan writes, “…was that on every level – military, diplomatic, political and economic – 
and in relation to every country in the region with the partial exception of Yugoslavia, the United States 
emerged from the war immeasurably stronger than it entered it” (271).  By this time, the Mediterranean was 
seen by many burgeoning U.S. strategists as a ‘unified entity’ whose future was now inexorably bound up with 
American security and prosperity.  Buchanan pictures President Harry Truman as working to consolidate 
Roosevelt’s legacy in the region, and his significant and persuasive work provides a platform for further 
research – which could provide an accent on either continuity or change – to span the important divide 
separating the end of the war in May 1945 and the extension of aid to Greece and Turkey in 1947.  
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Participants: 
Andrew Buchanan is a senior lecturer at the University of Vermont.  In addition to American Grand Strategy 
in the Mediterranean during World War II, he has published several articles on World War II.  His latest work, 
on the touristic experiences of American GIs in Italy during the war, will be published in a special issue of 
American Quarterly in fall 2016.  He is currently working on a comparative history of universal military 
service and on a textbook on the global history of World War II. 
Matthew Jones studied at St Antony's College, Oxford, for his D.Phil. degree in Modern History.  His books 
include Britain, the United States and the Mediterranean War, 1942-44 (1996), Conflict and Confrontation in 
South East Asia, 1961-1965 (2002), and After Hiroshima: The United States, Race, and Nuclear Weapons in 
Asia, 1945-1965 (2010).   He is currently Professor of International History at the London School of 
Economics and Political Science and working on a project dealing with UK strategic nuclear policy in the 
Cold War. 
Mary Kathryn Barbier received a Ph.D. from the University of Southern Mississippi and is Associate 
Professor at Mississippi State University.  Her books include, (editor) Sergueiew, Lily. I Worked Alone: Diary 
of a Double Agent in World War II Europe, (Jefferson, NC:  McFarland Publishing, 2014), Culture, Power, and 
Security: New Directions in the History of National and International History, co-edited with Richard V. 
Damms, (Newcastle upon Tyne, England: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2012);  America and the Vietnam 
War: Re-examining the Culture and History of a Generation, Co-edited with Andrew Wiest and Glenn Robins 
(New York: Routledge Press, 2010);  D-Day Deception: Operation Fortitude and the Normandy Invasion, 
Paperback edition, (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2009; D-Day Deception: Operation Fortitude and 
the Normandy Invasion (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007; Strategy and Tactics: Infantry 
Warfare: The Theory and Practice of Infantry Combat in the 20th Century,  Co-written with Professor Andrew 
Wiest, (Staplehurst: Spellmount Publishers, 2002). 
Dan Plesch is Director and Reader at the Center for International Studies and Diplomacy, SOAS University 
of London. His recent publications include (with Professor Thomas G. Weiss) the edited volume, Wartime 
Origins and the Future UN (London: Routledge 2015, and America Hitler and the UN (London: I B Tauris 
2011). He is currently writing a book on the 1943-1948 UN War Crimes Commission. 
Avshalom Rubin is a historian at the U.S. Department of State, specializing in the Middle East. He is the 
author of The Limits of the Land: How the Struggle for the West Bank Shaped the Arab-Israeli Conflict 
(forthcoming) and the editor of forthcoming volumes on Lebanon and the Arab-Israeli peace process in the 
Foreign Relations of the United States series. He received his Ph.D. in Middle Eastern history from the 
University of Chicago in 2010.  
Douglas Porch earned a Ph.D. from Corpus Christi College, Cambridge University. Distinguished Professor 
Emeritus and former Chair of the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School 
in Monterey, California, he is at present an Academic Visitor at St Antony’s College, Oxford and Visiting 
Fellow at Oxford’s Changing Character of War Programme. His books include The French Secret Services. 
From the Dreyfus Affair to Desert Storm (1995), The French Foreign Legion. A Complete History of the Legendary 
Fighting Force (1991) which won prizes both in the United States and in France, The Conquest of the Sahara, 
The Conquest of Morocco, The March to the Marne. The French Army 1871-1914, The Portuguese Armed Forces 
and the Revolution, and Army and Revolution. France 1815-1844. Wars of Empire, part of the Cassell History 
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of Warfare series, appeared in October 2000 and in paperback in 2001. The Path to Victory. The 
Mediterranean Theater in World War II was published by Farrar, Straus, Giroux and Macmillan in the UK in 
May 2004. It received the Award for Excellence in U.S. Army Historical Writing from The Army Historical 
Foundation. His latest book, Counterinsurgency. The origins, Development and Myths of the New War of War, 
was published by Cambridge University Press in 2013 and has been placed on the Army Chief of Staff’s 
reading list for all officers. At present, he is researching a book on French combatants in World War II.  
David B. Woolner is Senior Fellow and Resident Historian of the Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute, 
Senior Fellow of the Center for Civic Engagement at Bard College, and Associate Professor of History at 
Marist College. He is the author of Searching for Cooperation in a Troubled World: Cordell Hull, Anthony Eden 
and Anglo-American Relations, 1933-1938, forthcoming from Praeger Press and is co-editor with Warren 
Kimball and David Reynolds of FDR’s World: War, Peace and Legacies (Palgrave, 2008); with Henry 
Henderson of FDR and the Environment (Palgrave, 2005); and with Richard Kurial of FDR, the Vatican and 
the Roman Catholic Church in America, 1933-1945 (Palgrave, 2003).  His research interests include American 
foreign policy 1933-1945, transatlantic relations, US-Canada relations, and the history of the New Deal.  
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Review by Mary Kathryn Barbier, Mississippi State University 
ibrary and bookstore shelves groan under the weight of volumes related to the Second World War. 
These books engage a wide range of topics from a variety of perspectives and include official histories, 
campaign, diplomatic, home front, and political narratives, and firsthand accounts written by, among 
others, soldiers, sailors, pilots, government officials, and civilians. Because World War II historiography is 
quite extensive, scholars might legitimately ask whether or not historians can contribute anything else to the 
existing scholarship. With his newly published book, Andrew Buchanan, by proposing that scholars entertain 
a new interpretation of American decision making with regard to campaign in the Mediterranean, 
demonstrates that scholars still have much work to do. 
Scholars who focus on the military alliance forged by the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the United 
States identify the complex negotiations of the Big Three--Prime Minister Winston Churchill, Premier Joseph 
Stalin, and President Franklin D. Roosevelt--and their military advisors as they crafted a unified strategy to 
defeat the Third Reich. A crucial issue in those negotiations was the debate over the establishment of a second 
front in western Europe. Scholars agree that very early on Stalin demanded that the western Allies launch the 
second front campaign and that for the Soviet leader the only acceptable location for that assault was in 
northwest France. They also identify the different UK and U.S. positions regarding that second front. While 
the Americans advocated a 1942 Allied offensive across the English Channel into France, the British argued 
for an operation in the Mediterranean--in North Africa. 
As historians demonstrate, British and American political and military leaders hotly debated the proper, as 
well as the feasible, strategy for taking the war to the Germans. The prevailing thesis is that because of their 
desire to exert influence in the Balkans after the war, the British strenuously pushed for a North African 
campaign as the first joint military effort after America’s entry into the conflict. In addition, as both Churchill 
and his military advisors correctly argued, the possibility of a successful amphibious assault against northwest 
France in 1942 was slim. At the end of the day, because he wanted U.S. forces to launch a military operation 
in 1942, Roosevelt agreed to the North African campaign, known as Operation Torch. According to the 
accepted narrative, Roosevelt and his advisors reluctantly bowed to pressure from the British and acquiesced 
on the campaign front. As a result, Allied forces landed in North Africa in November 1942. 
In American Grand Strategy in the Mediterranean during World War II, Buchanan challenges the prevailing 
narrative. He argues that the American decision to support the British proposal for Operation Torch was not 
a reluctant one--at least not for Roosevelt--and that America was not a reluctant Allied partner. According to 
Buchanan, Roosevelt saw the big picture--that U.S. involvement in the Mediterranean could extend beyond 
the war. With Operation Torch, the United States gained a foothold in the Mediterranean that propelled the 
nation into a new global role in the postwar period, and the United States has never looked back. Buchanan 
concludes that Roosevelt was forward-thinking. While historians have criticized Churchill for maneuvering to 
preserve Britain’s empire after the war, they have failed to notice that, with every strategic position he took, 
Roosevelt was positioning the United States to step to the forefront and to supersede the United Kingdom by 
becoming the preeminent global leader after the war. Churchill did not have to pressure Roosevelt to deepen 
U.S. involvement in the Mediterranean. The President understood “how initial military success in North 
Africa created new military and political opportunities in the Mediterranean, and at Casablanca he kept 
pushing toward those prospects” (113). In other words, the United States’ grand strategic interests in the 
Mediterranean were substantial and were not the result of bowing to pressure to follow the British lead. 
L 
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After identifying his thesis, Buchanan then sets out to prove it. He painstakingly details the U.S. military and 
political engagement throughout the Mediterranean. For example, he chronicles the United States’ efforts to 
guarantee Spain’s neutrality by negotiating a trade agreement. As Buchanan demonstrates, because Spain was 
in need of certain goods, the United States used the trade deal as leverage to shape Spain’s behavior. When 
necessary, the United States slowed down the flow of goods until Spain complied with U.S. demands. 
Buchanan pays equal attention to U.S. efforts--political and military--in Italy, southern France, and the 
Balkans. 
Scholars have noted that the nature of the Allied relationship evolved during the war. That evolution played 
out in a number of ways--through campaign decisions and the nature of wartime occupation--and indicated 
that the Americans and the British did not always agree on strategy. The Big Three meeting at Teheran 
highlighted the split in the goals of the western Allies. Roosevelt and Churchill increasingly found themselves 
at odds. Scholars agree that the Yalta Conference further demonstrated the changing relationship dynamic. In 
the course of negotiations about future campaigns and plans for postwar Europe, Roosevelt and Stalin were so 
often on the same page that Churchill became the odd man out. 
Buchanan chronicles the reversal of western Allied leadership roles by weaving the political and military stories 
together in his discussion of the Italian campaign and Operation Anvil/Dragoon--the Allied landing in 
southern France. In doing so, he demonstrates that the United States moved from being the secondary to 
being the primary partner in the western Alliance. The United States increasingly became less likely to make 
decisions based upon what the British wanted. The litmus test for decisions was what the United States 
wanted or what was politically or militarily expedient for achieving America’s end goal. Buchanan 
demonstrates that shift by focusing on Italy, France, and the Balkans. In each case, the United States took 
steps to insure a postwar world in which it would be able to influence the emerging government. In addition, 
the situation on the battlefield occasionally forced the United States to adapt its policy to the political 
situation on the ground. By integrating the political situation into the military narrative, Buchanan presents a 
more complete picture of actions taken by the United States as part of its Mediterranean grand strategy. 
In order to explore this strategy thoroughly, Buchanan relies upon an extensive amount of source material, 
both archival and secondary. Although he draws from documents utilized by his peers, Buchanan reaches 
different conclusions. He presents an interesting, plausible account of U.S. engagement in the Mediterranean 
and makes a good case, supported by exhaustive evidence, that the United States used the Mediterranean 
campaigns as a springboard to the postwar role of superpower. 
American Grand Strategy in the Mediterranean during the Second World War makes an important contribution 
to the existing historiography of the war. Buchanan advocates for a new interpretation of the events. 
Suggesting that the Mediterranean was not a ‘peripheral’ theater for the United States, he argues convincingly 
that America was an active participant in the region; gradually assumed the lead role, forcing the British to 
take a back seat; and had substantive grand strategic interests in the Mediterranean. Buchanan’s book should 
appeal to a wide audience, including both interested lay readers and World War II scholars. 
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Review by Dan Plesch, Center for International Studies and Diplomacy, SOAS University 
of London 
his is a fascinating and informative account of U.S. involvement in the Mediterranean during World 
War Two.  The book provides a wealth of detail drawn from the archives on the development of 
intra-administration policy in the U.S. and especially on U.S. relations with the British. 
The book is at its strongest in considering U.S. policy towards Spain, France, and Italy, whereas the Balkans 
and the Eastern Mediterranean get a lighter touch.  The engagement of U.S. diplomats in the field, who in 
the main leaned towards fascist if not Nazi regimes, is well detailed.  In the case of the Spain the transition 
from appeasement out of military necessity early in the war to appeasement from political preference in 1945 
is well analysed. 
The author’s description of the United States’ use of military, food, and commercial supplies to ease out the 
British and control the development of politics in France and French Africa through to the end of the war is 
matched by a comparable account in Italy.  The elegant discussion of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s likely 
instruction to his field commander in Italy in May 1944 to ignore British orders and go for Rome rather than 
the capture of the German army is plausible (152-154). Though quite why a military victory and rapid 
advance into Northern Italy would not also have enabled U.S. political success is not really explored. 
There is substantial evidence here to support the view that Roosevelt’s open handed approach to Soviet leader 
Joseph Stalin bore fruit, with Communist support for Western-orientated coalitions being crucial to stability 
in France, Italy, North Africa, and even Spain.  The book does not, however, make this broader connection to 
Roosevelt’s grand strategy. 
And here lies a key issue with the argument. Grand Strategy is presented as focused on the prevention of 
Communist insurrection and the securing of markets for U.S. goods. This is somewhat inadequate. 
From the beginning of 1942, Roosevelt and his Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, relentlessly framed the war as 
being fought by the United Nations alliance on the principles that would build the peace.1 At the micro level, 
the book speaks of U.S. supplies of food to Africa as bearing U.S. markings, however they also bore a variety 
of United Nations marks by early 1943.2 The Italian armistice, for example, refers to the United Nations in 
almost every clause. For Roosevelt’s Administration, the Grand Strategy, which indeed included free trade, 
was the United Nations. 
There is a question too about U.S. pro-colonial policies. Elliott Roosevelt recounts his father’s grand scheme 
for a U.S.-style Tennessee-valley scheme for Morocco, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill complained 
that Roosevelt kept pressing on him a draft plan for a timetable of decolonisation, and the International 
Labour Organisation in Philadelphia in 1944 heard Roosevelt’s denounciation of government and corporate 
exploitation based upon his experience in the British colony of Gambia. 
The book begins naturally enough with a discussion of the U.S. landings in Africa – or Torch as they were 
called. Here the book portrays U.S. policy as driven by a desire to have a post-war presence in the region. 
There are other more decisive factors that need to be explored. First there was a clear imperative for Roosevelt 
to start fighting the Germans. In the U.S., the pre-war and pro-German policy of ‘America First’ had 
segwayed into Japan First. On the face of it, concentrating America’s fire on the nation that had attacked it 
T 
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made perfect sense, but the corollary was to delay perhaps indefinitely an attack on Adolf Hitler’s Third Reich 
in Europe. This left room for even Stalin to make a separate peace.  
Thus, with a landing in France demonstrably suicidal, as the Dieppe raid of August 1942 had demonstrated, 
Africa was the only place to fight at the end of 1942. It is also only late in the book that the utility of the 
landings in clearing the Mediterranean as a supply route to Russia is mentioned. At the time it loomed rather 
larger as a priority. 
It is a shame that apparently unanswered questions about the timing of Torch remain unexplored.  Roosevelt 
wanted the landings before the midterm elections. Churchill was desperate that El Alamein come before 
Torch so that Britain would get the first glory. American generals leaned to the Republican Party. This was, 
and is not, a petty matter. Despite the best efforts of Roosevelt and Hull, the Republicans made large gains in 
Congress in the elections that came before the landings in Africa. And one of their first actions when 
Congress resumed was to attempt to micro-manage Lend Lease to Russia with the support of America’s own 
Ambassador to Moscow, then Admiral Standley. 
A point of comparative analysis arises from the book’s careful analysis of individual nations. British policy 
favoured bolstering the ‘anciens regimes’ of kings and their associates. Only in Greece did British policy prevail 
over Roosevelt’s. And in Greece, even without Stalin’s support, the country sank into civil war whose scars 
remain today. In Italy and France, the British were pushed aside along with some of the independent and 
radical left. It was U.S.- and Soviet-supported regimes that were in place at war’s end, while, as the book 
describes, the ruling classes were re-established but in a broad-based coalition. Absent the grand strategy of 
Roosevelt, U.S. policy would have favoured the British approach and the Greek civil war could well have been 
but one of several along the littoral of the North-West Mediterranean. 
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Review by Douglas Porch, Emeritus Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey 
n his thoroughly researched and compelling American Grand Strategy in the Mediterranean during World 
War II, University of Vermont historian Andrew Buchanan advances the process of reassessing the 
importance of the Mediterranean theater to Allied victory in World War II. He generously gives this 
reviewer credit for challenging the master narrative formulated during the war largely by disgruntled U.S. 
generals of the Mediterranean as a wasteful, diversionary theater.1 When U.S. General Albert Wedemeyer 
complained that President Franklin D. Roosevelt had been enticed there by British Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill’s ‘baneful influence,’ he merely parroted the views of Generals George Marshall and Dwight 
Eisenhower, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, and Secretary of War Henry Stimson, verdicts endorsed by of a 
couple of generations of post-war historians. And while Buchanan agrees with Porch that the Mediterranean 
was indeed the war’s ‘pivotal theater’ for the Western Allies, he argues that so far the debate has been 
“fundamentally trapped within the framework of an argument over military strategy”(6). Instead, Buchanan’s 
ambition is to broaden the discussion from an adjudication of a wartime dispute between a protracted British-
inspired dawdle on Europe’s southern flank versus the prompt cross-Channel punch sought by U.S. military 
leadership.  Instead, he argues convincingly, the Mediterranean was central to Roosevelt’s grand strategy to 
remake Europe. 
Because ‘grand strategy’ is one of “the most elastic, slippery and abused concepts in the foreign policy 
lexicon,”2 and one that has evolved over time, Buchanan might have given rather more space to defining what 
exactly he means by the concept, and how ‘grand strategy’ differs from national strategy, strategic doctrine, 
war planning, and whether grand strategy shapes policy, or vice versa. Indeed, since he can find no document 
actually defining Roosevelt’s ‘grand strategic’ vision, one may question whether his ‘grand strategy’ exists at 
all? Buchanan clearly interprets ‘grand strategy’ to mean non-military forms of power. As such, his definition 
reaches beyond simply military statecraft as the World War II era and some scholars since might have 
understood it, to embrace the framework assumptions that underpin and govern policy-making.    
Buchanan’s essential thesis is that “Roosevelt understood that a U.S. victory required defeating the Axis 
powers while simultaneously preparing for a new world order of capitalist nations and free markets structured 
under the hegemony of the United States”(7). Roosevelt viewed the Mediterranean, not as an opportunistic 
venture, but as the place where this process would be initiated. So that, “far from being a diversionary theater 
or a cul-de-sac, Washington’s intervention in the Mediterranean was an indispensable element in the overall 
process by which America’s postwar hegemony in Europe and beyond was established,” through the exercise 
of political and economic, as well as military power (11). This point is hardly new – I and others have pointed 
out that one of the strategic benefits of the ‘Mediterranean detour’ was that it allowed the full power of the 
United States to be brought on line so that the American President would have a preponderant voice in 
shaping the post-war settlement.  Nor is it a secret that Roosevelt had a vision of a post-World War II world 
inherited from Woodrow Wilson in which ‘American Internationalism’ and market capitalism would loom 
                                                        
1 Douglas Porch, Path to Victory. The Mediterranean Theater in World War II, (New York: Farrar, Straus, 
Giroux, 2004). 
2 I thank my colleague at St. Antony’s College, Oxford, Lukas Milevski for these observations on the definition 
and scope of Grand Strategy. 
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large.  This was sometimes lost in his pragmatism, opportunism, and the opaque, even “idiosyncratic” (11) 
nature of U.S. foreign-policy making under Roosevelt.  
Buchanan reinforces and expands this view with the argument that Roosevelt realized that the June 1940 fall 
of France opened an opportunity to reshape the Mediterranean region. Strategically, the Mediterranean 
offered an entrée into Europe. It became the locus of his experiment, the test bed for his grand strategic vision 
of the democratization and liberalization of European politics and economies through political manipulation, 
civil affairs, Lend-Lease, security assistance, and other measures, so that the war and post-war became a 
continuum. (269) And while as a navalist with a particularly Mahanian geopolitical vision Roosevelt was a 
pioneer, by war’s end, Buchanan believes that U.S. policy makers “were developing a conscious grand strategic 
vision of the Mediterranean as a unified entity in which…’American security’ was linked to a ‘larger complex 
of Mediterranean issues’”(271). By 1945, the Mediterranean had been geopolitically transformed from 
Mussolini’s ‘prison’ or Churchill’s corridor to empire, to become Europe’s “southern flank” (271) in the 
words of Secretary of the Navy from May 1944 James Forrestal. 
Buchanan is nothing if not thorough; American Grand Strategy in the Mediterranean is comprehensively 
researched, at least from an Anglo-American perspective. However, given that his theme is how Roosevelt 
deployed various dimensions of U.S. power to achieve ill-defined influence in the region, a more extensive use 
of French and Italian sources, as well as Spanish ones, might have strengthened his case. The chapters on how 
Roosevelt attempted to deploy ‘carrots’ of food aid to appease Spanish caudillo Francisco Franco and Vichy 
leader Marshal Philippe Pétain are particularly successful. The machinations around the surrender of Italy in 
September 1943 are also enlightening. He is also honest, to the point that his research actually on occasion 
threatens the credibility of his thesis. For instance, Buchanan underscores the inconsistencies and ad hocery of 
Roosevelt’s policies which in many respects undermined his vision: on one hand, the President promised to 
reshape the Mediterranean through the implementation of Atlantic Charter freedoms while reforming and 
modernizing the politics and economies of southern Europe and French North Africa.  On the other, 
Roosevelt’s addictive appeasement and promotion of some of the Mediterranean littoral’s least savory 
reactionaries and mediocrities – Franco, Pétain, Admiral Jean Darlan, General Henri Giraud, Italian Marshal 
Pietro Bagdolio, the exiled monarchs of Greece and Yugoslavia, and Washington’s stubborn courting of 
royalist Yugoslav resistor "Draža" Mihailović long after it became clear that he was a doomed man – rather 
compromised the uplifting aspirations and geopolitical vision that Buchanan ascribes to him. The reason, of 
course, is that Roosevelt was a pragmatist. He had a war to win and courted those who he believed could help 
him achieve that goal. 
Those who apparently had little to contribute to Allied victory, like General Charles de Gaulle before 1944, 
were quick to point out the inconsistencies between Roosevelt’s grand rhetoric and his actions and to assign 
nefarious motives to them. Rather than rehabilitate and modernize Europe’s order, de Gaulle believed, 
Roosevelt sought to fragment the Continent to render it weak and dependent on the United States – which, 
of course, is precisely what transpired. Nor were the chosen executors of his Mediterranean ‘grand strategy,’ 
the smugly self-righteous when not totally clueless U.S. chargé d’affairs in French North Africa Robert 
Murphy and Roosevelt’s personal friend and U.S. Ambassador to Vichy until November 1942, Admiral 
William Leahy, visionaries to lead a revolution in Mediterranean affairs. This suggests that the Mediterranean 
may not have been as high a priority for Roosevelt as Buchanan believes that it was. In fact, the diplomatically 
inexperienced (at this stage) soldier Dwight D. Eisenhower seemed to have a more realistic grasp of the 
Mediterranean’s ground truths than did Murphy and Leahy. But, despite Eisenhower’s pleas, President 
Roosevelt stubbornly refused to recognize the Comité français de libération national (CFLN) and its President, 
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Charles de Gaulle, on the spurious pretext that de Gaulle had not been ‘elected.’ Buchanan acknowledges that 
this was mere cussedness on Roosevelt’s part, as he did business with a brace of leaders whose only claim to 
legitimacy was that they had managed to combine spinelessness with serial opportunism and incompetence. 
Indeed, Roosevelt might have followed Leahy’s advice at the Liberation of France to restore Pétain too, had 
Hitler not kidnapped the wretched Marshal and his collaborationist sidekick Pierre Laval to Sigmaringen.3  
But, as Buchanan concedes, political legitimacy in the Mediterranean was an elastic concept. Which leads one 
to ask – did the ‘flexibility’ of Roosevelt’s tactics render his master grand strategic concept as laid out by 
Buchanan meaningless? And if so, did U.S. quasi-hegemony in the Middle Sea then not come about by 
default, the result of the strategic vacuum created by the defeats of France and Italy, the irreparable weakening 
of Great Britain, and the rise of anti-colonial nationalism in North Africa and the Near East, rather than 
springing from Roosevelt’s overarching “grand strategic impulses?” (266) If American domination of the 
Middle Sea was going to occur in any case, how important was Roosevelt’s grand vision for the 
Mediterranean? 
The limits of Roosevelt’s Wilsonian liberalism were also evident as European reactionaries communicated to 
their U.S. interlocutors their fear of insurrection spearheaded by North African nationalists and British 
Special Operations Executive (SOE) and U.S. Office of Strategic Services(OSS)-armed resistance groups. So, 
rather than capture and channel the region’s revolutionary dynamic, the Allied arrival saw restorations, not 
revolutions, that dashed hopes for a remaking Europe’s political and economic structures. Furthermore, as 
Buchanan recognizes, this conservative outcome was incongruously assisted by none other than Soviet leader 
Joseph Stalin, rather than a grand strategic promise of American-style liberalism, modernization, and capitalist 
induced prosperity that diffused this alleged threat. Worried about the political radicalization of 
Mediterranean resistance movements, Moscow repatriated both communist leaders Palmiro Togliatti and 
Maurice Thorez to Italy and France respectively with orders to finish off the Wehrmacht before launching 
experiments in governance and ‘popular’ military reorganization. 
While Buchanan’s insistence on the limitations of viewing the World War II Mediterranean through a purely 
military lens is refreshing, one almost forgets in this account that there was actually a war going on. For 
instance, Michael Howard noted forty-five years ago that it was the General Bernard Montgomery’s October 
1942 victory over German General Erwin Rommel at El Alamein, not U.S. food aid, that ultimately 
convinced Franco that the Mediterranean military balance had definitely swung against the Axis. As a 
consequence, he did not invite Hitler to seize Gibraltar on news of the 8 November 1942 Allied invasion of 
French North Africa, the scenario most dreaded by Allied planners.4 Nor is there any mention of shipping, 
which was an important driver of strategic decision-making in the Mediterranean, as well as a limiting factor 
in securing ‘grand strategic’ influence through food aid and lend-lease.  In the process, Buchanan 
demonstrates how Roosevelt’s ‘grand strategy’ stumbled on the political level. It may be that Roosevelt was a 
Mahanian with a Wilsonian belief that post-war American security required a liberal world order. Buchanan                                                         
3 Indeed, until the eve of the invasion, Roosevelt continued to insist that any governance agreement with the 
Comité française de libération nationale (CFLN) was merely “tentative” and that Eisenhower was free to seek collaborators 
beyond de Gaulle’s structure, e.g. Vichy officials. Hilary Fotitt and John Simmonds, France 1943-1945 (Leicester: 
Leicester University Press, 1988), 28. 
4 Michael Howard, August 1942-September 1943, Volume IV, Grand Strategy, (London: HMSO, 1970), 167. 
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concedes, however, that there is no equivalent of George Kennan’s famous June 1947 “X Article,” no smoking 
gun policy document that outlines a coherent vision of transforming the Mediterranean into an American 
lake lurking in presidential or diplomatic archives. Rather, U.S. capital unleashed a “tide of history” that 
washed even through the tideless Mediterranean. () But it seems rather more like the “tide of history” swept 
through those countries where U.S. boots were on the ground. There were simply too many imponderables 
and variables for the Mediterranean to have witnessed the unfolding of “any a priori scheme” (267-268). 
Buchanan’s argument is certainly plausible. But when strategies, even grand strategies fail, one has to decide 
whether it was because the strategic vision was too ‘grand,’ or because it could not be realized on the 
operational and tactical level. The irony of Buchanan’s book is that the strategy seemed to succeed, despite the 
fact that it was poorly executed. So while Buchanan’s contribution is the important one of reminding us of 
the political dimensions of the Mediterranean venture, that venture’s success relied on military progress and 
the collapse of alternatives, not simply on the successful application of a political grand strategic vision. 
Despite the considerable strengths of this work, which reside both in its detail and its breadth, one 
nonetheless comes away with two fundamental concerns about Buchanan’s approach: first, his method, which 
he admits consists of “walking the cat backwards” – in other words, measuring in a linear fashion results 
against intentions (11) – might be criticized as fundamentally unhistorical.  The second concern follows from 
the first: in his haste to reinforce his overarching grand strategic narrative, Buchanan on occasion deploys a 
mixture of hypotheses, speculation, circumstantial evidence, and hazardous conjecture to bolster his 
conclusions.  It is one thing to state that evidence for a grand strategic vision will not be discovered in the 
archives. But it is quite another to speculate about the course of events for which proof is ambiguous or non-
existent.  
Let me take three examples, beginning with the decision for Torch, the Allied invasion of French North 
Africa in November 1942.At the January 1942 Arcadia Conference, with the USSR appearing on the verge of 
collapse, Roosevelt backed an early cross-Channel invasion, known as Sledgehammer, over Churchill’s plan 
for an invasion of the Mediterranean to rescue a beleaguered Malta, code-named Gymnast.. According to 
Buchanan, the American President’s ostensible support for his Chief of Staff was a ruse for his Mediterranean 
predisposition. The usual explanation for Roosevelt’s change of heart -- that the surprise fall of Tobruk to 
Rommel in June 1942 put the British Prime Minister’s parliamentary majority at risk -- is important to 
Buchanan’s thesis only in that it spurred a sense of crisis at the Washington Conference of that month that 
silenced opposition among the Joint Chiefs and tipped the scales for the U.S. commitment to the 
Mediterranean..   
A second example of how Roosevelt deployed Washington’s enormous productive capacity to achieve 
profound political and strategic advantages is his decision taken at Casablanca to arm eleven, later reduced to 
eight, French divisions. This served to convince the French elite that gradually coalesced around de Gaulle 
that only the United States would be capable of restoring French power.  “Given the sharp clashes that 
continued to mark Franco-American relations to the end of the war and beyond, this may seem to be an 
exaggerated claim,” Buchanan writes. “But with its path smoothed by the provision of trade and military aid, 
Washington shifted its relations from Pétain, to Darlan, to Giraud, and finally de Gaulle without crippling 
breakdowns and disjuncture.”(87) Indeed, if Buchanan proves anything by invoking the French case, it is the 
tenuous link between aid and ‘influence.’ Aid did little to stop Vichy’s chief minister Pierre Laval’s 
collaboration with the Nazi occupiers, nor induce Free French leader Charles de Gaulle to blubber with 
gratitude to the Anglo-Americans for rehabilitating the French army and Liberating France. 
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Third, while Buchanan’s account of the machinations surrounding the Italian surrender is interesting, his 
description of the fall of Rome lapses into conjecture. Buchanan insists that the capture of Rome marked a 
critical turning point in the war in the Mediterranean because possession of the Italian capital allowed 
Washington to prevail over London in debates over Allied strategy and the reshaping of Italy. Buchanan’s 
account of events goes as follows: 5th Army Commander Mark Clark was summoned to Washington in 
secrecy to meet with Marshall and Roosevelt on the eve of Operation Diadem, the breakthrough attack on the 
Monte Cassino line launched in May 1944. While Buchanan admits that it is impossible to know exactly 
what happened during Clark’s visit, in the context of the evolving political situation in Italy, “it is entirely 
possible that the president stressed the political importance of having American troops capture Rome.” (153) 
Armed with political cover, Clark ignored the instructions of 15th Army Group Commander Harold 
Alexander and ordered VI Corps commander General Lucien Truscott to break out of Anzio and dash for 
Rome. This allowed the German Tenth Army a resistance-free escape north.  
The title of “Liberator of Rome” failed to rescue Clark’s reputation. Carlo D’Este labeled Clark's dash to 
Rome, "as militarily stupid as it was insubordinate,"5 in part because he would have reached Rome sooner had 
he not tried to fight through the Alban Hills. But according to Buchanan, Roosevelt was eager to seize Rome 
ahead of the British so that King Victor Emanuel could fulfill his promise to abdicate and Bagdolio could be 
shunted aside in a cabinet reshuffle for someone more amenable to U.S. influence. But again, conjecture 
appears to guide Buchanan’s analysis.  “Most importantly, the evidence suggests that [Roosevelt} was 
instrumental in urging Mark Clark to march directly on Rome, thereby setting the stage for the reform of 
Italian politics and the consequent deepening of U.S. economic and political influence” (270). This is a 
curious assertion for several reasons, beginning with the fact that Buchanan never defines what he means by 
‘influence.’ The seizure of Rome was also superfluous politically, as Michael Howard opined that by the time 
of the Tehran Conference (28 November – 1 December 1943), the Allies had achieved all of their aims in the 
Mediterranean. Nor was the requirement to control the Italian resistance a dominant concern, as Stalin had 
stood down the Communist International the previous May and ordered all Communists in Italy and France 
to become “radical patriots.”(163-164)  
The charge that Roosevelt instructed his senior general in theater to disobey superior orders, allowing a 
German army to escape from the Cassino line to fight again another day, is also pretty serious, and all the 
more so since the tradeoff, according to Buchanan, was an unspecified reshuffle of a government in which the 
six major Italian parties including the Communists had already agreed to cooperate and that had accepted the 
‘long terms’ of the Italian surrender. King Victor Emanuel’s promise to abdicate was already in the bag. And 
all this was supposed to translate into an ill-defined increase of ‘American influence’ at the expense of the 
British. Why did Roosevelt need to seize Rome to increase U.S. ‘influence’ when Britain’s power and sway 
were clearly in decline? It is far more likely that Roosevelt told Clark to get off his arse and break the six-
months long siege of Monte Cassino. Otherwise, he would spend the remainder of the war pushing the tea 
trolley around the corridors of the Pentagon. The urgency was not so much to push forward some ill-defined 
experiment in Italian democracy and stiff the British. Rather, Clark needed to free up ships supplying the 
Anzio beachhead, and French and American divisions for Anvil, the overdue invasion of Southern France. 
That was Roosevelt’s priority, especially as Churchill was lobbying heavily for an invasion of the Balkans and 
an advance into central Europe through the Ljubljana Gap. 
                                                        
5 Richard Holmes, Battlefields of the Second World War "Cassino" 2001 BBC Worldwide, 126. 
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Roosevelt’s ‘vision thing’ also appears to have fallen short in France.  And no wonder. Having witnessed the 
disastrous application of Roosevelt’s new world order in Italy, the French, not surprisingly, were desperate to 
avoid Allied Military Government for Occupied Territories (AMGOT) or, especially, watch Roosevelt cut 
another shady deal with French collaborators as he had done in North Africa.  Most historians concede that 
by 1944 even FDR realized that he could not apply AMGOT in France, but he continued to threaten it just 
to keep de Gaulle off balance. For his part, the French leader-in-exile turned the tables on the American 
President by using the threat of Allied governance to whip recalcitrant French factions into line behind the 
CFLN. De Gaulle had pre-designated commissaires de la République and departmental ‘liberation committees’ 
standing by in order to prevent Resistance groups from taking power, and to impose order lest Liberation-
induced chaos give the Allies an excuse to turn to Vichy prefects and police for support.6  
Buchanan is unclear about Roosevelt’s vision for France: on one hand, he agrees with other historians that the 
President wanted to keep France weak, divided, and under Washington’s thumb, as de Gaulle predicted. On 
the other, he explains that Roosevelt sought to prevent “the re-establishment of the armed power of the 
French ruling class on its native soil.” (166) France required a well-defended government and state to disarm 
partisans, and neutralize potential rival centers of political power under U.S. oversight. But if that was 
Roosevelt’s vision, what was his plan to accomplish that beyond infusing France with civil affairs officers and 
what de Gaulle dismissed as “counterfeit” Allied occupation script?7 The result was that from a U.S. ‘grand 
strategic’ perspective, the invasion of France took place “in a political vacuum.” (179) The irony, of course, 
was that de Gaulle filled that political vacuum with a cadre of Free French administrators and a program to 
disarm the resistance, in defiance of Roosevelt’s grand strategic plan.  
How does American Grand Strategy change the narrative? Buchanan certainly seizes the momentum of World 
War II Mediterranean revisionism, and broadens Allied intervention in that sea to include a non-military 
focus. This makes American Grand Strategy an important book for bringing this to light, even if on occasion 
the author tries to over prove his thesis. His account may be interpreted as an essentially triumphalist U.S.-
centric vision of the war’s largely beneficial, if conservative and at times contradictory, outcome for the 
region.  
Likewise, if Roosevelt’s vision was to shape and stabilize the wartime Mediterranean by integrating it into a 
U.S.-dominated capitalist system, the result was significantly different. Indeed, when Buchanan kicks over the 
traces of his grand strategic vista, to focus on the social and economic dislocation caused by the Allied 
invasion and occupation of North Africa, Italy, and southern France in particular, the result appears to be 
significantly at odds with the plan. Arab nationalists who had been deceived by the vacuous promises of the 
Atlantic Charter, Italians who had been forced into crime and prostitution to survive the Allied ‘liberation,’                                                         
6 Jean-Louis Crémieux-Brilhac, La France libre. De l’appel du 18 juin à la libération, tome 1 (Paris: Gallimard, 
2001), 48; François Rouquet, Une épuration ordinaire (1944-1949). Petits et grands collaborateurs de l’administration 
française (Paris: CNRS Editions, 2011), 16. 
7 Roosevelt refused to allow the Comité française de libération nationale  (CFLN) to issue its own currency 
because it would have implied recognition of de Gaulle. Nor was “République française” to be printed on U.S. issued 
occupation script ostensibly so as not to preclude the French peoples’ post-liberation regime choice. François Kersaudy, 
Churchill and de Gaulle, (London: Collins, 1981), 319. Jean-Louis Crémieux-Brilhac, La France libre. De l’appel du 18 
juin à la libération, tome 2, (Paris: Gallimard, 2001), 1033, 1036. De Gaulle was indignant: Allez, faites la guerre, avec 
votre fausse monnaie" 
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and Marseilles dock workers who remained unconvinced about the benefits of Pax Americana, leave one to 
question whether Roosevelt’s Mediterranean ‘vision’ was embraced by those at whom it was directed. Indeed, 
more recent fin de la guerre evaluations have stressed the dark, humiliating side of World War II liberation, 
including a crisis of masculine, when not one of national, confidence, in France and Italy especially.8 This 
made particularly difficult the task of rebuilding societies that had been forced to make wartime compromises 
in order to survive. In fact, what World War II left behind was not an American-dominated lake, but a region 
roiled by anti-colonial revolts in North Africa and the Levant, Zionist immigration into Palestine supported 
by Washington, civil war in the Balkans, and an isolated and impoverished Iberian peninsula frozen in a pre-
war ideological system. The Algerian War (1954-1962) that imploded the French Fourth Republic was also a 
World War II legacy clash between unreconstructed Vichyites and Arabs jilted at the altar of the Atlantic 
Charter. This tumultuous outcome does not appear to have caused Buchanan to question the assumptions of 
Roosevelt’s grand strategic vision or its consequences. But he has nevertheless given us a well research, 
important, imaginative, and provocative book that significantly advances our understanding of the 
importance of the Mediterranean theater in World War II.  
 
                                                        
8 Fabrice Virgili, La France ‘virile.’ Des femmes tondues à la libération, (Paris: Payot, 2000); Olivier Wieviorka, 
Divided Memory. French Recollections of World War II from the Liberation to the Present, (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2012); Mary Louise Roberts, D-Day Through French Eyes. Normandy 1944, (Chicago and London: 
University of Chicago Press, 2014); William I. Hitchcock, Liberation. The Bitter Road to Freedom, Europe 1944-1945, 
(London: Faber and Faber, 2009). 
H-Diplo Roundtable Reviews, Vol. XVII, No. 15 (2016) 
 
Review by Avshalom Rubin, Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State1 
o most Americans, World War II remains ‘the Good War,’ a disinterested crusade fought to defeat the 
dark forces of Nazism and fascism.  The less savory aspects of the Roosevelt administration’s wartime 
policies, including its alliance with the Soviet Union, its tepid response to the genocide of European 
Jewry, its indiscriminate use of bombing against German and Japanese civilians, and the internment of 
Japanese-Americans at home, still primarily interest professional historians.  Nevertheless, those who study 
American foreign policy for a living have been critically re-evaluating President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
wartime diplomacy for several decades. While the President has been criticized from the right for his alleged 
naiveté in dealing with Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, some of the most pointed attacks on his foreign policy 
record have come from left-leaning scholars. For William Appleman Williams and his disciples, Roosevelt’s 
wartime policies were motivated not primarily by a desire to defeat totalitarianism but by the economic 
interests of a narrow elite. The so-called ‘Wisconsin school’ revisionists argued that the Roosevelt 
administration hoped to ensure that American capitalism, whose survival had been threatened by the Great 
Depression, would flourish during the postwar period. According to these scholars, the United States 
exploited the fight against the Axis powers in order to integrate Western Europe and East Asia into its 
economic orbit and to thwart the rise of indigenous leftist forces that played a prominent role in anti-Nazi 
and anti-fascist resistance organizations.  
Andrew Buchanan’s American Grand Strategy in the Mediterranean During World War II is in many ways a 
throwback to the Wisconsin school’s view of the U.S. role in the Second World War. He argues that the 
existing scholarship on U.S. involvement in the Mediterranean during World War II has been narrowly 
focused on the question of whether the U.S. invasion of North Africa in 1942 and the subsequent Italian 
campaign were a necessary precursor to the cross-Channel invasion of France or merely the result of British 
Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s ‘baneful influence’ on Roosevelt. “The problem, as President Roosevelt 
well understood, was that the United States’ orientation toward the countries of the Mediterranean – or any 
other part of the world, for that matter – could never be an exclusively military question,” Buchanan writes. 
By sending U.S. forces to fight in the Mediterranean theater, he argues, Roosevelt sought not only to achieve 
short-term military objectives, but to integrate the Mediterranean basin into “a new world order of capitalist 
nations and free markets structured under the hegemony of the United States” (6-7). 
And indeed, the case that Buchanan makes for his essentially Marxist argument is a good one. He has done 
prodigious research in American and British archives, contemporary press sources, and memoirs, and has 
carefully read the sizeable secondary literature on his subject. He is also a talented writer who explores his vast 
and complicated subject with subtlety and clarity. He demonstrates remarkable agility in moving between the 
many dimensions of America’s wartime involvement in the Mediterranean - from the debates between 
Roosevelt and his generals about the timing of a cross-Channel invasion to the intricacies of U.S. trade policy 
with Franco’s Spain and Vichy France to the Office of Strategic Services’ haphazard plans for covert 
intervention in Yugoslavian politics. 
From the beginning, Buchanan writes, Roosevelt and his advisors “never lost sight of the potential social 
consequences of the war or of the problematic nature of the postwar regimes that might emerge from the                                                         
1 The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department 
of State or the United States government. 
T 
H-Diplo Roundtable Reviews, Vol. XVII, No. 15 (2016) 
18 | P a g e  
 
wreckage” (13). U.S. policy toward Franco’s Spain and Vichy France was shaped not only by Roosevelt’s 
desire to keep those regimes from lending military help to Hitler, but also by administration officials’ fears 
that wartime deprivation would later help leftist forces take power. In March 1941, the administration signed 
a lucrative trade deal with the Vichy authorities which permitted huge supplies of American goods to be 
shipped to France’s colonies in North Africa. Even after the United States entered the war in December 1941, 
“the trade accord staggered on.” Roosevelt did not fare quite so well in his efforts to extend a $100 million 
dollar loan to Spain for the purchase of American commodities. For liberal publications like The Nation and 
The New Republic as well as policymakers like Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau and Secretary of 
the Interior Harold Ickes, aid to the hated Falange was a bridge too far. But the President still quietly 
permitted private trade between the two countries to continue.  
Roosevelt justified his policies toward Spain and Vichy France on the grounds that they helped keep both 
countries from entering the war on Hitler’s side. But even once American GIs landed in North Africa, the 
President was in no hurry to empower Vichy’s opponents. Disingenuously insisting that the United States 
could not recognize leaders who had not been chosen by the French people, Roosevelt quickly recognized the 
Vichyite commander-in-chief of the French armed forces Francois Darlan as high commissioner of the 
‘French North African state.’ Though the ‘Darlan Deal’ outraged American liberals, Roosevelt and his 
advisors initially saw it as preferable to dealing with Free French movement leader Charles De Gaulle, whom 
they saw as a possible stalking horse for communists within the French resistance. Not until June 1943 would 
De Gaulle be permitted to take part in governing North Africa. The administration’s socially conservative 
approach to North Africa was likewise evident in the economic sphere. To prevent popular unrest, the United 
States provided French North Africa with Lend-Lease aid, which was funneled through Vichy authorities who 
exploited their position as middlemen for personal profit. Roosevelt and his advisors unwaveringly supported 
continued French colonial rule in the areas under American military control, despite the fact that this policy 
did not quite align with the principles of the Atlantic Charter. Morocco, Roosevelt confided to one American 
diplomat, might be ready for independence in “thirty or forty years.”  (107) While such policies frustrated 
indigenous Arabs and Berbers and enraged De Gaulle, they provided the Americans with an environment in 
which they could build up a vast network of military bases and secure a foothold in the North African 
economy, making it much easier to turn the Mediterranean into an ‘American lake’ once the war was over.  
As Buchanan ably demonstrates, America’s occupation of North Africa also provided the Roosevelt 
administration with a jumping-off point from which the much more important prizes of Italy and France 
could be secured, as well as practical experience in the art of shaping the politics of countries under 
occupation to the long-term advantage of the United States. In both the Italian and French cases, the 
Americans also benefited from Stalin’s desire to protect his gains in Eastern Europe by acknowledging the 
western Mediterranean as part of the Anglo-American sphere of influence. This meant that French and Italian 
communists did not capitalize on the widespread labor unrest that flared up in both countries as the Nazis 
were driven back.  Roosevelt was thus spared having to choose whether, as he put it in the case of Italy, to 
“use force against the anti-Fascist leaders and groups” (144). The popularity of leftist groups and the scale of 
civil unrest in both France and Italy made cooperation with figures associated with the Vichy and Fascist 
anciens regimes a less attractive option than in North Africa. Yet Stalin’s decision to rein in his French and 
Italian followers meant that the Americans had a free hand to fashion liberal governments in both countries.  
Indeed, when it came to reestablishing political order in France and Italy, the Americans found themselves at 
loggerheads with the British, not the Soviets. Churchill frowned upon U.S. efforts to rehabilitate the Italian 
economy and opposed American plans for using Allied troops in Italy to take southern France. Yet, as 
Buchanan shows, the British Prime Minister was largely powerless to prevent Roosevelt from doing as he 
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pleased. By 1944, the Americans, not the British, were very clearly the ‘senior partner’ in the Mediterranean 
theater. 
Even readers who do not have a particularly triumphalist outlook on America’s role in World War II may find 
Buchanan’s critique of Roosevelt’s policies overly harsh. While Buchanan evinces grudging respect for 
Roosevelt’s skill as a statesman, he makes it clear that he regards the President’s ultimate aims as morally 
suspect. To the extent that Buchanan’s book has heroes, they are the industrial workers, communist activists, 
and leftist partisans whose aspirations Roosevelt sought to marginalize in order to create a liberal-capitalist 
postwar order. He never acknowledges that the postwar order that the United States helped to establish in 
Italy and France brought those countries prosperity and political stability, or that the governments established 
there had much popular support. Rejecting Geir Lundestad’s argument that the postwar Western European 
order was a form of “empire by invitation,”2 Buchanan argues (in the case of Italy) that “the wartime 
occupation regime morphed seamlessly into a postwar relationship of U.S. hegemony, with the so-called 
empire by ‘invitation’ resting firmly on military government and direct intervention into the affairs of another 
ostensibly sovereign state” (208). 
This rather cavalier dismissal of Lundestad’s thesis flies in the face of findings by scholars like Melvyn Leffler 
and John Lewis Gaddis, who have emphasized the economic and legislative constraints that the Truman 
administration faced in maintaining a U.S. role in Europe during the 1945-47 period.3 But it also raises the 
question of what Buchanan thinks a ‘good’ postwar outcome in a Mediterranean state would have looked like. 
For Buchanan, the answer is something like Yugoslavia, where leftist forces triumphed and managed to avoid 
being coopted by either superpower. Yugoslavia, he writes, “offers a glimpse of the alternative possibilities 
latent throughout southern Europe” (277). Given the choice, however, I believe that most Europeans would 
have preferred to live in liberal-capitalist Italy or France than Josip Broz Tito’s police state. Buchanan may be 
right that Roosevelt’s wartime policies in the Mediterranean were animated more by power politics and U.S. 
economic interests than the lofty ideals of the Atlantic Charter. But such policies never would have enjoyed 
such of a postwar afterlife without the support of Mediterraneanites themselves.  
Regardless of whether readers share Buchanan’s critical view of American globalism, they will profit from 
reading his well-written, thoroughly researched, and passionately argued book. He has succeeded in 
illuminating many hidden dimensions of a well-known episode in American foreign policy, and will inspire 
his readers to think harder about Roosevelt’s geopolitical legacy. 
                                                        
2 See Geir Lundestad, “Empire By Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945-1952,” Journal of 
Peace Research, 23 (3) (1986): 263-277. 
3 John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1972); Melvyn Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992).  
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Review by David B. Woolner, Roosevelt Institute/Marist College 
I agree that we had better leave the past to history, but remember if I live long enough I may be one of the 
historians—Winston Churchill, January 1944 
hanks to the commanding influence of those writers whom the scholar David Reynolds has 
referred to as “the court historians” of the Second World War, some very powerful narratives 
about the course and nature of the conflict have become almost permanent fixtures in the 
historiography of the period.1 Perhaps the most compelling of these truisms—fostered in large part 
by British Prime MinisterWinston Churchill’s massive account of the war—is that the 
Mediterranean was preeminently a British theatre; an area of operations that the United States 
entered most reluctantly, and in which the U.S. played an important, but nevertheless, secondary 
role—always with an eye toward getting out of the region as quickly as possible.  This narrative has 
been reinforced by the official U.S. Army histories of the war, by the memoirs of General Dwight. D 
Eisenhower and others, and by such works as Michael Howard’s brief but astute The Mediterranean 
Strategy in the Second World War, in which Howard argues that the war in the Mediterranean was 
pursued largely as a result of political necessity and opportunism.2 Under this scenario, President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s decision to launch the invasion of North Africa in the fall 1942—over the 
objections of his Chiefs of Staff—was based solely on his determination to open a ‘Second Front’ 
that year and get the American public and military involved in the war in Europe as quickly as 
possible. Unable to bring the fighting in North Africa to a close until May, 1943—too late to 
reassemble the forces required to launch an invasion of France that summer—the Allies made the 
decision to take Sicily, in the expectation that this in turn might lead to the capitulation of Italy, 
allowing Allied forces to move onto the Italian peninsula that fall in a further effort ‘to close the ring’ 
around Germany before the final thrust into France. 
There is a good deal of truth in Howard’s account. There is no question, for example, that 
opportunism played a significant role in determining the course of the war in the Mediterranean. 
Howard’s evidence also puts to rest any notion that the British determination to press on into Italy                                                         
1 David Reynolds, “On Histories and Historians,” in From Munich to Pearl Harbor: Roosevelt’s America and the 
Origins of the Second World War (Chicago: Ivan R Dee, 2001), 6; “FDR’s Foreign Policy and the Construction of 
History, 1945-1955,” in FDR’s World: War, Peace, and Legacy, edited by David B. Woolner, Warren F. Kimball, and 
David Reynolds (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 7. Among others, the “court historians” Reynolds refers to 
would include Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (New York: Harper, 1948); Herbert Feis, 
Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War they Waged, the Peace they Sought (Princeton: Princton University Press, 1957); and 
William Langer, Our Vichy Gamble (New York: W.W. Norton, 1966). 
2 Michael Howard, The Mediterranean Strategy in the Second World War (London: Greenhill Books, 1993); 
Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942 (Washington D.C: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1980); George F Howe, Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West (Washington, 
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957); Dwight David Eisenhower Crusade in Europe (New York: Doubleday, 
1948).  
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was driven by Churchill’s prescient desire to get into Central and Eastern Europe ahead of the 
Russians. But like most other historians of the Mediterranean Theatre in World War II, Howard 
makes no mention of the possibility that the Roosevelt Administration might have pursued the war 
in the Mediterranean not merely for reasons of political and military expediency, but also out a 
desire to further America’s own long-term military, political and economic interests in the region. 
The idea that the Roosevelt Administration’s might have used the conflict in the Mediterranean as a 
means to establish American hegemony in this important part of the world is taken up in Andrew 
Buchanan’s excellent new book, American Grand Strategy in the Mediterranean during World War II. 
Not content to confine his work merely to an examination of the military history of America’s 
involvement in the Mediterranean theatre, Buchanan’s comprehensive study shows us that to fully 
understand America’s involvement in the region we must examine all aspects of American policy. 
When we do so, a number of important considerations come into sharp relief, perhaps the most 
important of which is his assertion that the pursuit of American interests in the Mediterranean 
became Roosevelt’s ‘personal policy’—a personal policy based on a multi-faceted and multi-layered 
approach to this complex part of the world that in retrospect constitutes the essence of grand 
strategy. Viewed from this perspective, Buchanan makes clear that “far from being a diversionary 
theatre or a cul-de-sac, Washington’s intervention in the Mediterranean was an indispensible 
element in the overall process by which America’s postwar hegemony in Europe and beyond was 
established” (11). 
Buchanan’s analysis also brings to life a number of other new and largely overlooked dimensions of 
U.S. wartime policy in the Mediterranean. In North Africa, for example, we learn that the 
requirement to maintain order and stability among a restive colonial population during wartime, 
which necessitated throwing U.S. support behind the conservative ruling elite, in essence meant that 
the United States maintained unwavering support for French colonial rule in North Africa and that 
this policy formed a fundamental aspect of the postwar reestablishment of French power. Of course, 
striking deals with such nefarious figures as the arch conservative Vichy collaborationist, Admiral 
François Darlan, did not sit well with the American press, which was quick to point out how this 
arrangement violated the principles articulated in the Atlantic Charter. Fortunately for Roosevelt, 
Darlan’s assassination a few weeks after signing the deal provided the Roosevelt Administration with 
the opportunity to ‘moderate’ its policies in the face of this criticism. The result was the promotion 
of General Henri Giraud and the first tentative steps towards U.S. support for the Free French 
Committee of National Liberation (CFLN). But given the fundamentally conservative nature of 
Giraud, and the equally conservative nature of his irascible arch rival, General Charles de Gaulle—
neither of whom had any interest in promoting democracy or self-determination in the Maghreb—
these apparent shifts towards a more liberal policy in North Africa in fact helped solidify the status 
quo not only there, but also in France.  
A similar story can be found in the U.S. involvement in Italy, where America’s initial support for the 
monarchy and a new government formed under Mussolini’s former Chief of Staff, Marshal Pietro 
Badoglio—a regime that the New York Times cynically described as “a military dictatorship resting 
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on the shadowy authority of a puppet king”—soon gave way to American support for a more broad 
based regime (129). As in North Africa, Badoglio’s ouster, which was initiated by liberal forces 
within Italy and resulted in the formation of a new government under the former prime minister and 
anti-fascist Ivanoe Bonomi, allowed the Roosevelt administration to throw its weight behind 
moderate as opposed to radical reforms, staving off the possibility of a socialist revolution, while at 
the same time allowing US policy towards Italy to take on a more forward-thinking nature. 
Buchanan also asserts that these developments were greatly facilitated by a general understanding 
achieved among the Big Three at the 1943 Teheran conference, in which Stalin tacitly agreed to 
divide Europe into two broad spheres of influence, with Poland and much of Eastern Europe falling 
under the Soviet sphere, while Italy, France, and Western Europe fell under the Anglo-American 
sphere. In practical terms this meant that while Stalin might continue to use national Communist 
Parties under Soviet influence as instruments for the application of political pressure in Western 
Europe, he would also—under the ‘grand accommodation’ achieved at Teheran—use his influence 
to ensure that “popular hostility towards discredited social and political systems did not give rise to 
revolutionary upsurges” (164). Hence, in a very direct sense, Moscow became an active participant 
in securing the postwar order in Western Europe. Interestingly, the one exception to this rule was 
Yugoslavia, where the fierce independence and radicalism of Josip Broz Tito’s communist partisans 
“caused as much concern in Moscow as it did in Washington” (247).  
Taken together, the developments on the ground in places like Italy, along with the understandings 
achieved with Stalin, allowed the Roosevelt Administration to take a more progressive political 
approach in its dealings with Western Europe. This ‘liberal turn,’ Buchanan argues, eventually 
brought Washington’s Mediterranean policy into conformity with the ideological war aims 
articulated in the Atlantic Charter and Four Freedoms. Finally able to put its previous dealings with 
the assorted ‘Quislings’ of the early years of the war behind it, and free too to put greater pressure on 
Franco’s Spain now that it was clear to all concerned that Germany was indeed going to lose the war, 
Washington was at last able to seize the moral high ground. This allowed the Roosevelt 
Administration to bury the actual history of its political intervention in the Mediterranean deeply 
and permanently—at least in terms of its popular political perception—with the result that its 
policies in the region could take their rightful place in the narrative of the ‘Good War’ (247). 
Buchanan’s book—which is well written and well researched—makes for fascinating reading. 
Perhaps its only shortcoming stems from the author’s treatment of the Roosevelt Administration’s 
push for ‘bi-lateral free trade,’ which, while important, and driven in part by American business 
interests, was also part of a much larger effort to secure a multilateral freer trade regime under the 
auspices of U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull’s Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act. For Hull and 
his adherents in the State Department, these bilateral agreements were but a means to achieve 
multilateral ends; they constitute an important part of U.S. foreign economic policy during the war, 
which Buchanan alludes to in his discussion of American promotion of the ‘Open Door,’ but never 
quite fully addresses.   
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This is an important work. It not only fundamentally changes our understanding of the Roosevelt 
administration’s wartime policy in the Mediterranean, but also places America’s involvement in this 
region within the larger military, political and economic context of the war. Thanks to Buchanan’s 
efforts, this much maligned and oft-overlooked “peripheral theatre,” may now take its rightful place 
as an integral part of the overarching effort to win the war in Europe. 
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Author’s Response by Andrew Buchanan, University of Vermont 
 would like to thank all five reviewers for their close and attentive reading of American Grand Strategy in 
the Mediterranean during World War II and for their insightful comments and criticisms.  All five agree 
that the existing master narrative of the war in the Mediterranean—a narrative crafted by “disgruntled 
U.S. generals” (Douglas Porch) and “court historians” (David Woolner) —is in need of revision.  To various 
degrees, they are all open to my argument that the United States did in fact have a grand strategic orientation 
to the Mediterranean during World War II, even if its precise nature and scope remains a matter of debate.  
In this light, the reviewers raise numerous important points of difference and probe areas of unclarity, but it 
seems most productive to take their comments as contributions to an ongoing discussion rather than as points 
requiring specific rebuttal.  In this brief reply, then, I restrict my comments to one overarching issue and four 
questions of detailed interpretation. 
The most substantial challenge to my thesis raised here comes in the form of Porch’s astute probing of my use 
of the concept of ‘grand strategy.’  My intention in using the term ‘grand strategy’ is to capture what Mary 
Barbier refers to as Franklin D. Roosevelt’s focus on the “big picture,” and my approach rests, as Woolner 
notes, on an examination of “all aspects of American policy,” integrating its military, political, and economic 
elements into a “multi-faceted and multi-layered” approach to the Mediterranean basin.  The integration of 
these elements enables us to see how America’s postwar predominance in the Mediterranean did not, as Porch 
suggests, “come about by default,” but was the product of a conscious effort driven forward from the very 
highest levels of the American government.  This is easy to assert but hard to prove.  As Williamson Murray 
has argued, grand strategy is not a “recipe” or a blueprint, but an “idiosyncratic process” that gives rise to a 
broad line of march, the precise contours of which can often only become fully evident with hindsight.1  This 
definition may seem like an evasion, particularly because it inevitably leads to an evaluation of intent in the 
light of outcome.  In reality, however, this is the only way that grand strategy can work, particularly where a 
rising power is extending its influence into a complex, war-riven, and highly fluid region, and when the 
unexpected contingencies of battle can upend the best-laid plans. 
As I suggest in the book, rather different criteria apply once predominance has been established and a new 
hegemonic power is working to organize and defend its position.  This is the framework within which the 
National Security Council was established in 1947 (272–273).  During the wartime rise of American power, 
however, grand strategy could not simply proceed from a master plan drawn up (and carefully documented) 
by top-level leaders and then executed by their agents on the ground.  It must necessarily have had a more 
improvisational and provisional character. My argument here rests, as Avshalom Rubin underscores, on an 
appreciation of Roosevelt’s ability to keep the desired postwar order in sight even as he navigated the 
turbulent and unpredictable rapids of war (Rubin, 2).  Roosevelt was guided in this process by what I refer to 
as a grand strategic impulse, a ‘vision thing’ that sought the establishment of a capitalist, liberal, and 
American-led postwar Mediterranean that would be embedded in a similarly-structured world order.  
‘Impulse’ may not be the best word, but I use it in an attempt to capture the messy reality in which the 
economic and political imperative to create a new American-led order was connected to the actual 
establishment of that order by a series of feedback loops that were themselves shaped by complex                                                         
1 Williamson Murray, “Thoughts on Grand Strategy,” in Williamson Murray, Richard Hart Sinnreich, and 
James Lacey (eds.), The Shaping of Grand Strategy: Policy, Diplomacy, and War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2011), 9, 10. 
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contingencies.  These contingencies included both unpredictable outcomes on the field of battle and shifting 
networks of political relationships with both allies and adversaries.2 
From this point of view, Roosevelt’s “inconsistencies and ad hocery” did not “undermine[d] his vision,” as 
Porch suggests, but were on the contrary indispensaible to its realization.  As Woolner notes, Roosevelt’s 
capacity to make grand strategy his “personal policy,” juggling numerous and often apparently contradictory 
elements while keeping his eyes fixed on the horizon, was the essence of his leadership.  That is not to suggest 
that everything was well executed.  Far from it.  America’s war in the Mediterranean was replete with its fair 
share of blunders, missteps, and downright errors; indeed, looking at the Allied military campaign in Italy, 
one can agree with Porch that American strategy was successful “despite the fact that it was poorly executed.”  
The bigger point, however, is that Roosevelt and his senior colleagues kept moving forward towards their 
desired goals despite the military and political difficulties on the ground.  In this sense, my ‘respect’ for 
Roosevelt’s skill is by no means as “grudging” as Rubin suggests—although, of course, respect does not 
necessarily imply agreement or approval. 
This touches on a broader question of method.  I am happy to own the “essentially Marxist argument” that 
Rubin attributes to me, with the proviso that this is the Karl Marx who wrote that  “men make their own 
history […] but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past.”3  In this 
sense, my work is an attempt to explicate some of the complex linkages between determinism (the rise of 
American economic and military power), agency (the actions of individual human beings, including those of 
Roosevelt and other leaders), and contingency (particularly the inherent chanciness of military affairs).  Not 
surprisingly, I do not see this methodology as a ‘throwback,’ to the Wisconsin school, but as a contribution 
that points towards achieving greater (and more complex) integration of various levels of historical analysis. 
Moving on to some brief comments on more specific questions.  Firstly, all five reviewers acknowledge the 
attention that I give to Soviet policy, and recognize the importance of bringing it more to the center of the 
Mediterranean stage: as Dan Plesch notes, Roosevelt’s “open handed” approach to Stalin was crucial to the 
establishment of stable “Western-oriented coalitions” throughout the region.  Joseph Stalin’s policy here was 
not as “incongruous” as Porch suggests.  On the contrary, Moscow’s stance in the Mediterranean, and in 
particular its explicit instructions to local communist parties not to take advantage of wartime chaos to launch 
bids for power, flowed from the essentially defensive character of Soviet Russian policy.  I do not say this to 
prettify Stalin’s police state, but simply to observe that the defense of that state, and of the power and 
privileges of its ruling elite, ranked far higher in the Kremlin’s priorities than did any notion of extending the 
socialist revolution.  From this point of view, the division of Europe sketched out at Teheran set the 
framework for the establishment of American hegemony in the Mediterranean and Western Europe.   
Secondly, the establishment of American predominance required the forging of suitable relationships with 
emerging postwar governments throughout the region.  As Rubin underscores—and I, perhaps,                                                         
2 Warren Kimball gets at a similar idea in his discussion of Roosevelt’s “relaxed but unshakeable Americanism.” 
Warren F. Kimball, The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 
198. 
3 Karl Marx, “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte,” Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected Works, 
(Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1979) Vol. 11, 103. 
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underemphasized—this process required both American military power (and in Italy an increasingly 
American-led military government) and the forging of close working relationships with national elites.  As 
Geir Lundestad has argued, this new order was to a significant extent an “empire by invitation.”4  My point, 
however, is that the ‘invitations’ were issued in the context of American military supremacy, and their appeal 
to national elites was sweetened by large-scale American economic assistance.  This understanding, as I stress 
in the book, speaks to a concept of hegemony that combines a claim to political, moral, and cultural leadership 
with the blunt assertion of military and economic predominance (3).  Both Woolner and Plesch rightly point 
to aspects of the exercise of American hegemony through multilateralism that I either downplayed or 
neglected entirely: Woolner emphasizes the importance of multilateral free trade over the bilateral trade 
agreements that I focus on, while Plesch stresses that Washington often spoke and acted on behalf of the 
putative United Nations.  While these corrections do not alter my main argument, they are important 
nuances. 
Thirdly, Plesch suggests that the book would have benefitted from a closer examination of the connections 
between the timing of Operation Torch and domestic political considerations in the United States.  He is 
right.  While Roosevelt was extremely sensitive to American public opinion, he was not driven by it.  In this 
light, Plesch’s suggestion that (unspecified) “generals [who] leaned to the Republican Party” ensured that 
Torch was postponed until after the November 1942 midterm elections is surely misplaced.  Roosevelt’s 
interest in an American intervention in North Africa dated back to the fall of 1940, and it was motivated by 
geopolitical concerns rather than the pursuit of partisan advantage.  Moreover, while Roosevelt certainly 
hoped to reap electoral gains as the side product of a successful invasion, he was sanguine when army Chief of 
Staff George Marshall informed him that the invasion would have to take place after the midterm elections.5  
Senior officers did not usually—and with the important exception of Douglas MacArthur—participate in 
party politics, and I know of no evidence that the officer corps as a whole ‘leaned’ to the Republican Party.  In 
fact, many officers, like Marshall himself, studiously avoided partisan politics altogether.  The big point here 
is that while Roosevelt certainly had his differences with his military chiefs, they centered not on party 
politics, but on his frustration with what he saw as their narrowly focused opposition to his broad grand 
strategic vision.  Moreover, as the war went on—and after Roosevelt had won the decisive battle over the 
large-scale commitment of American forces to the Mediterranean—these tensions diminished to the point of 
vanishing. 
Fourthly and finally, a few comments on the American capture of Rome in June 1944.  Here, Porch suggests, 
my book lurches off into a world of “conjecture.”  If that means advancing an unproven (and perhaps, given 
Roosevelt’s well-known aversion to minutes and notes, inherently unprovable) hypothesis to explain one of 
the most controversial episodes of the Mediterranean war—General Mark Clark’s decision to disobey direct 
orders from his immediate superior in order to launch his own successful bid to capture Rome—then I plead 
guilty.  Like all good hypotheses, however, this one is grounded in the available evidence, including Clark’s 
often-overlooked meeting with Roosevelt right before the launch of the campaign.  The direct and immediate 
political consequence of Clark’s military action was the removal of Pietro Badoglio’s conservative government                                                         
4 See Geir Lundestad, “Empire By Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945-1952,” Journal of 
Peace Research, Vol. 23, No. 3 (1986), 263-277. 
5 See Matthew Moten, Presidents and Their Generals: An American History of Command in War (Cambridge, 
MA: Belknap Press, 2014), 217–218. 
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and its replacement by a liberal-Communist coalition under Ivanoe Bonomi.  This new government, as 
Washington well knew, would be amenable to forging close ties with the Americans, whereas the previous 
Badoglio government had conformed closely to Churchill’s conservative vision.  The violence of Churchill’s 
reaction to this American-sponsored coup de main, conducted while Clark’s orders excluded all British civilian 
officials from Rome, indicate that he was in no doubt that the removal of Badoglio signaled a marked decline 
in British influence and a further step towards the consolidation of American predominance.  These are, as 
Porch points out, weighty matters.  But my conclusions offer a coherent explanation of Clark’s blatant 
insubordination—usually attributed, rather unconvincingly, to his vanity and hunger for publicity—and of 
the remarkable fact that he got away with it.  I do not deny that this explanation involves a leap of conjecture, 
but it is a leap, as Barbier points out in relation to my overall methodology, that is grounded in the careful 
intertwining of political and military narratives.   
Once again I would like to thank the five reviewers for their hard work, and Tom Maddux and Diane 
Labrosse at H-Diplo for pulling this roundtable together; in the light of these comments and contributions, I 
trust that this will be the beginning of a lively and fruitful discussion.  
